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Financial analysts are generally regarded as an important information source in security
markets, with their industry analysis, earnings forecasts and stock recommendations typi-
cally being used as a key input in their brokerage clients’ investment decisions. Analysts’
prominent role in ﬁnancial markets is partly justiﬁed by a large body of literature that
provides evidence on their ability to predict or inﬂuence stock prices (e.g. Imho and Lobo
(1984), Stickel (1990) and (1991), Womack (1996), Gleason and Lee (2003), Green (2006)).
Yet, in spite of their proven informativeness it has long been suspected that ﬁnancial analysts
may not e!ciently combine all information at their disposal, and in particular that they may
not e!ciently combine public and private information. In fact, recent studies on corporate
earnings forecasts by Zitzewitz (2001), Bernhardt, Campello and Kutsoati (2006), and Chen
and Jiang (2006) show that on average, when issuing forecasts, ﬁnancial analysts tend to
place excessive weight on (i.e. they overweight) their private information, thus exaggerating
their dierences with the consensus.1 And, more importantly, that they do so in ways that
hint to the existence of substantial cross-sectional dierences in exaggeration/misweighting
patterns among them.2
In this article I expand on this literature by investigating the implications of analysts’
misweighting behavior for their stock recommendations, arguably ﬁnancial analysts’ most
relevant output. Speciﬁcally, I explore whether the same misweighting phenomenon that has
been uncovered for earnings forecasts is also present in stock recommendations; the way in
which it manifests in the data; and the extent to which investors are aware of, and properly
adjust for it. Most importantly, I work to link cross-sectional variation in exaggeration in
forecasts and recommendations, and analyze the usefulness of forecasts-derived information
in characterizing analysts’ recommendations.
I interpret stock recommendations as a forecast of future returns, which allows me to
exploit much of the framework used in the study of earnings forecasts. The main challenge
1A result that challenges the (until recently) prevailing view that analysts systematically herd (see e.g.,
Trueman (1990) and (1994), Hong et al. (2000), Welch (2000)).
2Here and throughout this paper I use the expressions “exaggeration” and “overweighting of private
information” (“herding” and “underweighting of private information”) interchangeably.
2in extending the information misweighting analysis to recommendations is that, unlike fore-
casts, recommendations are issued in a scale (strong buy, buy, hold, etc.) that is not directly
and unequivocally linked to the units in which the variable recommendations try to predict
(abnormal returns or price changes) is measured. It is then not possible to say whether
analysts as a whole exaggerate or not when issuing recommendations —given that the rec-
ommendation scale is not anchored at any value— but what can be investigated is whether
a given recommendation change (e.g. from hold to strong buy) is associated to systemati-
cally dierent abnormal returns when issued by dierent analysts. If a pre-identiﬁed group
of analysts’ strong buy recommendations (or equivalent signal) only lead, on average, to
marginal abnormal returns, whereas a control group’s recommendations are associated to
signiﬁcantly larger abnormal returns, this may be an indication that the ﬁrst group of ana-
lysts’ extreme recommendations were issued on somewhat fragile grounds. If in addition to
that this pre-selected group of analysts was deﬁned based on its past exaggeration behavior
in issuing forecasts (which can be unambiguously, albeit noisily, measured), the evidence will
be even stronger. After all, these analysts, if aware of the poor quality of the information
in which their recommendation upgrade was based, could have made a more conservative
recommendation change (or the others a more aggressive one).
My main hypothesis is that the same analysts who exaggerate or overstate the weight
of the information they convey (their private information) when issuing forecasts also do
so when making recommendations, and that this is reﬂected in their recommendations’
subsequent performance. Earning forecasts, unlike recommendations, can be easily used
to classify analysts according to their herding/exaggeration behavior without resorting to
market information. I exploit this advantage by using a forecast-based exaggeration measure
to sort analysts into dierent groups. I ﬁnd that analysts whose earnings forecast revisions
showed signs of greater exaggeration in the past make recommendation changes that lead
to lower abnormal returns than their peers, a result that suggests that there is indeed a
signiﬁcant relationship between analysts’ exaggeration in forecasts and recommendations.
Forecast-based exaggeration quartiles produce a hedge return spread at recommendation
issuance between low past exaggeration and high past exaggeration analysts of 2.54% for two
recommendation level changes (1.78% for one recommendation level changes) on average.
The mentioned result is resilient to the inclusion of several control variables and is not
3driven by the timing of recommendations, nor by ability or information content dierences
among analysts.
Since in e!cient markets any dierences in the quality of the recommendation signal
should be fully reﬂected in returns accruing in a small window of the recommendation
change, the bulk of the analysis concentrates on event returns. I also explore post-event
a b n o r m a lr e t u r n st om a k es u r et h a tw h a ti sc a p t u r e di naﬁ r s ts t a g ei sn o tm e r e l ya ne v e n t
phenomenon that is reversed afterwards, but also to test whether the marginal investor
correctly accounts for analysts’ heterogeneity (along the exaggeration dimension) when using
analysts’ information. Consistent with previous research I ﬁnd an important under-reaction
to recommendation changes, reﬂected in signiﬁcant post event-returns. This under-reaction,
however, is not signiﬁcantly larger for recommendations issued by analysts in the lowest,
or any of the exaggeration quartiles, what implies that the market is mostly aware of these
cross-sectional dierences among analysts. Importantly the initial inter-analysts’ dierences
are not reversed in the post-event period, and remain signiﬁcant even for holding periods
of 6 to 12 months, the time horizons most typically attributed to ﬁnancial analysts. This
result is somewhat puzzling, it suggests that the marginal investor is approximately e!cient
in grasping cross-sectional dierences among analysts but still fails to properly account for
the average information content of their pronouncements when taking analysts as a group.
Establishing a link between forecasts and recommendations’ attributes and environments
also enables me to examine whether exaggeration and ability measures derived from past
earnings forecasts are informative about future returns to recommendation revisions even
after controlling for information obtained from past recommendations.3 In principle an inﬁ-
nitely large sample of past recommendations should be informative enough about abnormal
returns to future ones, to the point of driving forecast-derived information unnecessary and
uninformative. In reality, however, there are only a limited number of recommendations per
analyst and a limited but larger sample of forecasts on which to base inference, leaving open
the possibility that past forecasts could potentially provide incremental information. When
3Loh and Mian (2006) have linked earnings forecasts attributes (accuracy) to recommendation perfor-
mance, but their framework is exploratory, not predictive. That is, they investigate the contemporaneous
association between both and do not attempt to present a model that predicts the proﬁtability of future
recommendations based on analysts’ historical forecasts attributes.
4I jointly evaluate both types of signals, I ﬁnd that none of the two is subsumed by the other.
Both past forecasts and past recommendations contain orthogonal information and are good
predictors of an analyst’s future recommendation proﬁtability, lending support to the idea
that past earnings forecasts can be useful in characterizing analysts’ recommendations.
My paper is related to previous work by Welch (2000), who looks for evidence of herd-
ing in ﬁnancial analysts’ stock recommendations ﬁnding that buy or sell recommendations
have indeed a signiﬁcant positive inﬂuence on the recommendations of the next two an-
alysts. Welch, nonetheless, stops short of claiming this as evidence of herding, aware of
the possibility that correlated recommendations may be merely the result of limited private
information instead of mutual imitation. The approach followed in this paper tries to over-
come this shortcoming by explicitly controlling for the existence of correlated information
among analysts. But this can only be done at the expense of giving up on the general ques-
tion: Do analysts, taken as a whole, herd when issuing stock recommendations? Instead I
look at cross-sectional dierences in herding or exaggeration among analysts, and to the per-
sistence of these dierences.4 This study is also distinct from Welch’s analysis in that here
the benchmark to which analysts may herd (if/when they do) is the market consensus re-
ﬂected in current market prices, arguably the best summary measure of public information,
as opposed to the consensus recommendation or other previous recommendations, which
are usually not as recent as the ﬁrst.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally discusses the problem
and the methodology used to link exaggeration in the forecast and recommendation domains
(and to test for the existence of a relationship between them). Section 3 provides a descrip-
tion of the data. Section 4 presents the results on cross-sectional dierences in analysts’
exaggeration and returns to recommendation revisions. These results, their robustness,
and relevance in the presence of alternative controls derived from past recommendation
information are further discussed in Sections 5 and 6, which also step back and look at
the relationship between abnormal returns and exaggeration using forecast data. Finally,
section 7 summarizes the main ﬁndings and concludes.
4Finding a signiﬁcant cross-correlation between the way analysts weight public and private information
in forecasts and recommendations may be indicative that aggregate results found for forecasts may well
extend to recommendations.
52 Hypotheses Development and Methodology
2.1 Model and Deﬁnitions
2.1.1 Earnings Forecasts5
Financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are a blend of private and publicly available informa-
tion. Formally, let ] denote ﬁrms earnings that an analyst forecasts, and assume public in-
formation, observable by both analysts and investors, is represented by a common Gaussian
prior on ]:





where F is the market consensus about ],a n dSF is known as the prior’s precision (or
consensus’ precision). And let \ be the analyst’s private signal about ] such that:





This information is private in the sense that \ is observed only by the analyst and %\
is distributed independently of all other variables. By Bayes’ rule, the best conditional
estimate of ] given \ is:
(3) H [] | \ ]=k\ +( 1 k)F
where k 
S\
SF+S\ 5 [0;1] is the precision of analysts’ private signal relative to consen-
sus. On average, analysts of higher ability will have signals with higher precision. This is
incorporated in the analysis by allowing kl to dier among analysts.
The analyst, due to strategic and/or behavioral reasons, may not necessarily apply the
e!cient or Bayesian weight k. Instead he may follow any other forecasting strategy. Let
(4) I = n\ +( 1 n)F
be the actual forecasting strategy followed by the analyst, where n is the actual weight
he places in his private signal. Every time n 6= k it will be said that the analyst misweights
information. More precisely
5The treatment of earnings forecasts follows that of Barron et al. (1998) and Chen and Jiang (2006).
6Deﬁnition 1 An analyst i is said to exaggerate or over-weight the tenor of his own private
information if nl Ak l. If the opposite happens, that is if nl ?k l, it will be said that
the analyst compresses or under-weights his own information. Further, analyst i is said to





Specialized to earnings forecasts this deﬁnition implies that what deﬁnes exaggeration
is not how much the forecast deviates from consensus but how much it deviates in excess
of what is e!cient. If the analyst systematically over-weights or exaggerates the tenor
of his own information or private signal then, every time he issues a forecast that revises
the consensus, he will be revising it excessively, which will be reﬂected in his forecast
overshooting, on average, the actual earnings ﬁgure in the direcction of the forecast revision,
and the opposite will happen if he under-weights or compresses that information. This is
more clearly seen if (3) and (4) are combined to express the analyst’s forecast error as a
function of his forecast’s deviation from the consensus:






Note that the mangitude and direction of the forecast error in (5) depends on analyst’s
exaggeration, n
k. This relationship can be estimated empirically. In the regression
(6) (Iw  ]w+)= +  (Iw  Fw3)+%w





, with a positive (negative) b  suggesting
over-weighting (under-weighting). What leads to the following proposition (a restatement
of Chen and Jiang’s (2006) Proposition 1), which formalizes these results:
Proposition 1 Suppose Y and F are generated according to (2) and (4). Then: (i)  is
zero if and only if the analyst uses e!cient weights. Further A0 if k A ha n d?0 if k






Analysts’ objective with their stock recommendations is to help those who follow them, their
clients, to make proﬁtable trades and obtain superior returns. It is then natural to assume
that recommendations are issued with a view on future returns, or even more speciﬁcally,
that they are the mapping of some forecast of future abnormal returns (DU). The problem,
and information environment, analysts face in issuing these recommendations seems indeed
analogous to the one they face in the context of earnings forecasts. In fact we can think
that to arrive to their recommendations analysts must combine existing publicly available
information, summarized by market prices, with their private information (signal), the result
of their own research into the company.
Under these circumstances the common prior:





reﬂects the idea that in e!cient markets expected abnormal returns should be zero when
the information set contains only publicly available information.
Letting \u be the analyst’s private signal (which we should expect to be correlated with
\ , the contemporaneous earnings signal) orthogonal to any public information.





Then by Bayes’ rule:
(9) H [DU | \u]=ku\u
where ku 
S\u
SFu+S\u 5 [0;1] is the relative precision of analysts’ private signal. Again,
analysts’ actual return forecasting strategy may dier from the e!cient one. Concretely, let
(10) Iu = nu\u
describe the return forecasting strategy the analyst follows, where nu is the actual weight
he places in his private signal.
8Analysts, however, do not communicate their forecasted returns (Iu) directly, but in-
stead they issue a categorical signal: a recommendation or recommendation revision (U).
It is sensible to assume that forecasted returns are mapped into recommendations (or rec-
ommendation revisions) according to a rule like (11)
(11) if
;
A A A A A A ?
A A A A A A =
W2 ?I u ? 4
W1 ?I u ?W 2
W31 ?I u ?W 1
W32 ?I u ?W 31










U = Vwurqj Vhoo
for some unknown thresholds T2,T 1,T 31 and T32, such that:
T32 ?W 31 ? 0 ?W 1 ?W 2
6
If that is the case (expected) abnormal returns following recommendations (or recom-
mendation revisions)
(12) H [DU | Up]=H [DU | Wp31 ?I u ?W p]
will be a function of analyst’s weighting behavior, summarized by the parameter
nul
kul,
as well as of their ability, kul, and the amount of publicly available information on the
stock, summarized in this case by the prior’s precision SFu. More speciﬁcally, the following
proposition can be proved:
Proposition 2 Suppose recommendations are generated according to (10) and (11). Then
(i) |H [DU | Ul





kum for non-neutral recommendations, once ana-











CSFu ? (A)0for positive (negative) recommendations.
Proof: See appendix.
6It is assumed here that there is an implicit correspondence between recommendations (or recommen-
dation changes) and analysts’ expected abnormal returns, to make communication between analysts and
investors possible. Alternatively, instead of considering Wp as being ﬁxed and nl as being what distinguishes
analysts one could have taken the opposite road, assume nl = kl for all i but that Wpl is idiosyncratic to
each analyst; or some combination of the two.
9That is, in the context of stock recommendations, exaggeration will be reﬂected in
dierential expected returns per unit of recommendation, even after controlling for analysts’
ability. For some analysts even a tenuous signal, one suggesting only a minor mis-valuation
in the stock, will lead to a strong recommendation (these ones exaggerate relatively more),
whereas others with the same information would have settled for a more conservative revision
or no revision at all (these ones compress or under-weight, relatively, their information).
Accordingly, expected returns to recommendation revisions by analysts in the ﬁrst group
will be smaller than expected returns to identical revisions by analysts in the second group,
w h e nt h er e c o m m e n d a t i o ni sp o s i t i v e( B u y ,S t r o n gB u y ) ,a n dt h eo p p o s i t ew i l lb et h ec a s e
for negative recommendations (Sell, Strong Sell).
Unlike what happens with earnings forecasts, it is not possible to say whether analysts,
on average, exaggerate or not when making stock recommendations. The problem is that
stock recommendations are issued in a scale dierent from the scale in which returns are
measured. If analysts instead of issuing a categorical recommendation or recommendation
change would state the percentage they expect the stock to appreciate or any other equally
quantiﬁable magnitude this problem would not exist.
Proposition 2 also points to expected abnormal returns being dependent on analysts’
ability, even keeping exaggeration ﬁxed. This result, while in principle very intuitive, con-
trasts with the one obtained for earnings forecasts where all that is needed to back up
expected earnings is a measure of exaggeration, and is a consequence of the discrete nature
of recommendations (where a whole interval is mapped into a point). In general, the higher
the ability of an analyst the larger the chances that the abnormal returns he identiﬁes lay
further away from zero, within the given recommendation interval. An analogous reasoning
applies to prior precision, the weaker this prior, the more likely large abnormal returns
(within the limits set by the recommendation thresholds).
2.2 Empirical Approach
According to the model in the previous section predictable cross-sectional dierences in ex-
aggeration among analysts should echo in clear and predictable return patterns following rec-
10ommendation issuance.7 In the context of earnings forecasts, Chen and Jiang (2006) identify
substantial heterogeneity across analysts regarding their weighting behavior. I conjecture
that similar cross-sectional dierences in exaggeration exist, perhaps even exacerbated, in
the recommendations domain. I therefore work under the premise, and test the hypothesis,
that the same analysts that over-weight (under-weight) their own private information when
issuing forecasts also over-weight (under-weight) that information when making recommen-




kul are positively correlated across samples. In doing this
I take a neutral stance regarding the reasons or origins of these cross-sectional dierences
in exaggeration.
To be precise, if ﬁnancial analysts’ recommendations carry some information (previous
studies suggest they do) and if there is a link between the cross-sectional variation in fore-
cast exaggeration and recommendation exaggeration, then we should expect to ﬁnd smaller
abnormal returns, per unit of recommendation change, for those analysts whose forecasts
are typically more exaggerated. These dierential abnormal returns will materialize on the
day the recommendation is released (event returns), if the market is aware of this link; on
post event returns, if the market fails to recognize this relationship; or in a combination of
the two if the market under/over-reacts to these cross-sectional dierences.
To investigate this issue I sort ﬁnancial analysts into dierent groups, according to their
perceived exaggeration, and then compute abnormal returns to the recommendation changes
made by them. I do this according to the following criteria: every month I estimate analysts’
exaggeration level using all forecasts released up until that month and for which the corre-
sponding actual earnings ﬁgures have also been made public, I assign analysts to dierent
bins depending on their estimated exaggeration levels, and then compute abnormal returns
following recommendation changes for analysts in each bin. Exaggeration levels are esti-
mated using pre-recommendation change information and, in most cases, further classifying
7Even when the models presented are perhaps highly stylized the analysis can be generalized to situations
where the underlying variables are not normally distributed and the forecasts (and resulting recommenda-
tions) are not linear sums of signals. A more robust deﬁnition of exaggeration simply claims that an analyst
over-weights (under-weights) private information if his forecast deviates too much (too little) from the con-
sensus in the same direction as his private signal (making the exaggeration measure used still valid). In
the context of recommendations over-weighting (or exaggeration) will be related to excessively optimistic
or pessimistic recommendations, even in the presence of only tenuous signals.
11analysts according to the number of forecasts employed in the exaggeration estimation (the
reason to do this is that estimates based on a smaller number of forecasts are more likely to
adopt extreme values and be assigned to extreme bins, only due to the larger variance of the
estimator).8 Double sorting procedures between exaggeration — ability and exaggeration —
prior’s precision are also employed to isolate the eect of exaggeration.
For each group of analysts I measure short term or event abnormal returns using daily
data for the window [t — 2, t + 2] of the recommendation change (t=0).9 Event returns
capture market’s assessment of the dierential information content of recommendations is-
sued by dierent analysts. Concretely, if the market anticipates that an analyst is likely
to exaggerate more than his peers every time he makes a recommendation, it should react
less strongly to his recommendations (than the way it reacts on average) and vice-versa.I f
markets e!ciently assimilate analysts’ information then event returns should capture all
cross-sectional dierences in the quality and information contained in the recommendation
signal.
Post event abnormal returns on the other hand are measured using calendar time port-
folios and daily data. Abnormal Returns are computed for the 6-month, 12-month and
24-month periods that follow the end of the ﬁve-day event window containing the recom-
mendation change. Post event long-term abnormal returns measure market’s under/over-
reaction to analysts’ pronouncements. If analysts’ weighting behavior is properly calibrated
by market participants expected post event abnormal returns should be zero for all analyst
groups. On the other hand if the market fails to properly adjust for (the diering) exag-
geration propensities of dierent analysts’ groups we should expect abnormal returns to low
8This procedure has some shortcomings since it does not recognize the fact that analysts’ behavior may
vary from one stock to another, and even change through time, which is in fact what previous studies
suggest. But, with only limited data, a compromise must be reached between level of detail in the analysis
and improved estimation precision. Besides, these problems may be attenuated by the fact that analysts
usually specialize in industries, which are not very heterogeneous, and that the sample used in the study is
relatively short so time variation in exaggeration may not be so signiﬁcant either. In any case it is important
to notice that these problems do not invalidate the approach pursued in the paper, they only make it more
di!cult to succeed in identifying a relationship between exaggeration in forecasts and recommendations.
So if one is eventually found it will be all more notorious.
9A standard window in the literature. As a robustness check I also compute event returns for the window
[t — 2, t + 19] of the recommendation change (t=0).
12exaggeration analysts to be larger than abnormal returns to high exaggeration analysts.
By studying a precedence relationship between exaggeration in forecasts and recommen-
dations, as opposed to a contemporaneous one, I want to make sure the results I obtain
are not spurious and driven by correlated shocks to forecasts and recommendations but
instead obey to real and persistent exaggeration patterns. This procedure also enables me
to explore whether exaggeration patterns are persistent enough to be exploitable by market
participants and used as conditioning information in portfolio formation.
3 Data and Variables Construction
I obtain data on ﬁnancial analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations from the
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database for the period January 1992
to December 2004 for earnings forecasts and January 1995 to December 2004 for stock
recommendations.
I concentrate on recommendation revisions, as opposed to recommendation levels. Re-
visions are discrete and salient events and previous research generally ﬁnds that they have
signiﬁcant information content (Womack 1996, Jegadeesh et al. 2004, Agrawal and Chen
2005, Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006).10 To construct the recommendation change vari-
able I rely on I/B/E/S recommendations’ classiﬁcation. I/B/E/S classiﬁes recommendations
into ﬁve categories, from 1 to 5, which are usually interpreted along the following lines: (1)
strong buy, (2) buy, (3) hold, (4) sell and (5) strong sell. The recommendation change
variable is computed as the dierence between the new recommendation level, as reported
by I/B/E/S, and the previous recommendation level for that same stock and analyst. This
means that the analyst issuing the recommendation is required to have an outstanding or
previous recommendation on the same stock to consider a recommendation change.11
10See Jegadeesh et al. (2004) for a comparative analysis of abnormal returns to recommendations and
recommendation changes.
11An advantage of computing recommendation revisions this way is that it better accommodates the
scarcity of “sell” and “strong sell” recommendations, and mitigates the eect of the shift from a generalized
recommendation inﬂation during most of the sample period to a more conservative stance late in the sample.
13The primary use of earnings forecast data is in constructing the “Exaggeration Quar-
tiles”. For this purpose I employ quarterly earnings forecasts for the immediately coming
ﬁscal quarter, i.e. forecasts issued after the announcement of the previous quarter earnings
and before the current quarter ones. This data is obtained from the Detail History ﬁle of
I/B/E/S. The sample is restricted to the post 1992 period since before then the accuracy
of the forecast release date in this database is disputed, and precision regarding the date
and ordering of the forecasts is required in order to obtain an accurate estimate of exag-
geration.12 In addition to limit the sample to 1992 — 2004, I also eliminate observations
with current share price of less than $2, mainly due to the fact that extreme outliers are
concentrated among these stocks.
I measure analysts’ exaggeration in forecasts using the regression coe!cient ()i nt h e
regression of forecast error (F — Z) on the forecast deviation from consensus (F — C) as in
equation (6) of the preceding section; with consensus computed as the mean of the three most
recent forecasts.13 This equation is estimated for each analyst in the sample, every month
from December 1994 to December 2004. Each monthly estimation uses all forecasts released
by the corresponding analyst since 1992 up until that month; and for which the quarterly
earnings ﬁgure they are an estimate of has already been announced. With this procedure
I make sure all information used in the exaggeration estimation is publicly available and
could have been used by investors to assess analysts’ behavior. I also require at least 50
observations in the estimation, to avoid having a large and heterogeneous amount of noise
in the measure, therefore excluding analysts with a small number of forecasts.
The outlined procedure produces a continuous estimate of  for each analyst-month pair
in the sample that satisﬁes the above-mentioned restrictions. To ameliorate the eect of
12Only since 1991 — 1992 almost all analysts have entered their forecasts directly into the I/B/E/S system
on the day they wish to make their forecast widely available. See Zitzewitz (2001) for a more detailed
discussion of this issue.
13Accurately measuring the consensus is sometimes regarded as a critical issue in estimating exaggeration,
since measurement error could bias the estimated coe!cient. In addition to the chosen measure other
alternatives used in the literature are to use the mean of all outstanding forecasts and the econometric
expectation of earnings (Zitzewitz 2001); inverse and linear weighted averages of previous forecasts, which
attach more weight to recent forecasts (Chen and Jiang 2006), or even the last available forecast previous to
the one being released. Estimates of weighting patterns based on all these measures tend to be qualitatively
similar and quantitatively not very dierent.
14estimation error in these coe!cients, I group analysts into four dierent bins or quartiles
depending on their estimated exaggeration coe!cient that month, with Quartile 1 containing
the less exaggerating analysts and Quartile 4 the most exaggerating ones. I do this according
to a two step sorting procedure: in a ﬁrst step I classify analysts into two groups based on
the number of forecasts they issued up until that point, and then, in a second step, within
each of those two groups the exaggeration based sorting takes place (so that forcing analysts
with heterogeneous amounts of forecasts in each exaggeration bin). These quartiles are then
updated each month. This procedure serves also a second, and perhaps more important,
purpose. Since abnormal returns to recommendation revisions are followed for up to two
years after recommendation issuance the only viable alternative to eliminate cross-sectional
dependence in the sample is to adopt a portfolio approach, and this requires to group
analysts into a reduced number of categories.
Finally, I match each recommendation change to the “Exaggeration Quartile” the ana-
lyst who made the recommendation had been assigned to in the previous month (to make
sure all information is in investors’ information set). This basic procedure leaves us with
90,696 recommendation changes for the chosen sample period.14 These recommendations
cover 6,738 ﬁrms/securities, which means that an average of 13.5 recommendation changes
are made for each ﬁrm during the 10 year period of the sample. The sample includes recom-
mendations by 2,925 individual analysts and 250 brokerage ﬁrms. There are an average of
31 recommendation changes per analyst and the median recommendation change is made
by an analyst who makes a total of 20 recommendation changes.
It is evident from Table I that buy and strong buy recommendations are much more
frequent than sell and strong sell recommendations (47,882 vs. 7,129). As it is that we are
more likely to observe recommendation downgrades (51,912 in this sample) than recommen-
dation upgrades (only 38,784), which is probably due to the fact that most analysts initiate
coverage with positive recommendations. Three- and four-class upgrades and downgrades
are rare events, which range from 155 to 498 in the entire sample, and in most of the tests in
this paper I opt to exclude them to avoid problems derived from a potential lack of power.
14The number of recommendations used in some particular tests may be smaller however due to data
availability on control variables.
15In addition to exaggeration the simple model introduced in the previous section points
to two additional variables with predictive power over abnormal returns: analyst’s ability
and prior’s precision. I proxy analyst’s ability with the following measure, which, as shown
in Chen and Jiang (2006), increases monotonically on ability and is independent of analysts’
weighting strategy:
(13) 2 · Pr[vljq(I  F)=vljq(]  F)]  1
Forecast accuracy, which would seem to be the natural candidate to gauge analysts’
ability, has the problem of not rendering a reliable measure of talent, every time an analyst
could simply repeat the forecast of another analyst known to be talented and end up with his
same measure of ability. Prior’s precision on the other hand is proxied by the inverse of the
standard deviation of the daily stock returns in the month preceding the recommendation
release date. Equipped with these two measures I proceed to repeat the steps taken with
exaggeration in the formation of four dierent bins or quartiles both for ability and prior’s
precision and match them to the corresponding recommendations.
Besides these main variables and return data, which is from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP), I also employ a series of additional controls in some tests. These
include, analysts’ experience, deﬁned as the number of years since the analyst ﬁrst released
a forecast recorded in I/B/E/S; analyst workload, computed as the number of forecasts
issued since 1992 up until the day of the recommendation; trading volume and ﬁrm size,
obtained from CRSP, and broker reputation/size which is a modiﬁed form of the Carter and
Manaster (1990) measure updated by Jay Ritter and available on his website.
4 Results: Returns to Recommendation Changes
4.1 Event Returns
To explore markets’ assessment of the dierential information content of recommendations
issued by dierent analysts groups I compute buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for
16as h o r tw i n d o w[ t 2; t+2] of the recommendation change. BHARs are computed using the
size adjusted methodology. As is standard in the literature (see Womack, 1996, Mikhail et
al., 2004, Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 2006) I focus on a ﬁve-day window centered around
the recommendation day to capture the initial market reaction to the revision, and to allow
for possible delays by the brokerage in reporting its recommendation or leaks of information
before its public release.
I classify recommendation changes according to a double sorting procedure. First I sort
them into two main groups depending on the number of IBES levels changed (one or two);
a n dt h e ni n t of o u rd i erent categories according to the relative over-weighting or exagger-
ation level of the analyst issuing the recommendation.15 The main results are displayed
in Table II. What is immediately evident from this table is that hedge returns to recom-
mendation changes are economically (and statistically) very signiﬁcant; they range from
6.5% to almost 10%, depending on the speciﬁcation, for the ﬁve-day window surrounding a
recommendation change, i.e. for an average of 3.5 trading days. Abnormal returns to down-
ward revisions in recommendations are larger than abnormal returns to upward revisions
by an average of 1.5% for the ﬁve-day window around the recommendation change, which is
consistent with previous ﬁndings and with the idea that downward revisions are a more sig-
niﬁcant or informative event. Besides returns to two level revisions are larger than returns
to one level revisions, which certainly conforms with intuition. Heteroskedasticity corrected
p-values, for all groups, are well below 0.01, even when I opt to exclude observations that
have overlapping return windows.
What is most remarkable from Table II however is the clear pattern of smaller return
reactions to recommendations issued by analysts that tend to exaggerate or over-weight
private information more when issuing forecasts, consistent with the hypothesis of a rela-
tionship between forecast and recommendation over/under-weighting. Not only short term
hedge returns decrease monotonically as we move from the lowest exaggeration quartile to
15Whereas there are typically several thousand recommendation changes of one or two levels, there are
only a few recommendations that entail a change of three or four levels (around a hundred in each group)
and I therefore opt to exclude them. To have an idea a four recommendation levels change can only happen
if an analyst changes his strong sell recommendation for strong buy or vice versa, which is a rare event
indeed (three level changes would entail moves from strong sell to buy or sell to strong buy, or vice versa).
17the highest but also each of its two components, abnormal returns to recommendation up-
grades and abnormal returns to recommendation downgrades, behave in the same way. This
pattern is both economically relevant and statistically signiﬁcant. For quartiles one and four
the dierence amounts to 2.54% for a two recommendation levels change and 1.78% for a
one recommendation level change for the ﬁve calendar days (3.5 trading days) comprised
in the event window, with an F statistic of approximately 30 (p-value ? 0.01). Even when
one might have expected a link between exaggeration in forecasts and recommendations
this result is striking in its magnitude (notice that it amounts to a 25% dierence). An
explanation of this phenomenon, in line with the advanced hypothesis of a link between
exaggeration in forecasts and recommendations, is that analysts who exaggerate more when
issuing forecasts also tend to exaggerate more when making recommendations, and the mar-
ket (investors) is, at least to some degree, aware of and discounts this behavior. In fact, if
markets are e!cient we should expect all the relationship between the two (exaggeration
and abnormal returns) to be concentrated in a short window of the signal release.16
To check the robustness of this ﬁnding I also extend the event window to [t2; t+19]
(see Table III). Results are qualitatively identical to those of Table II and quantitatively
not very dierent. I also split the sample (analysts) into two groups depending on the
number of forecasts analysts making the recommendation issued up until the day of the
r e c o m m e n d a t i o nr e v i s i o n . T h ep u r p o s eo ft h i se x e r c i s ei st om a k es u r et h a tt h es o r t i n g
procedure employed (exaggeration) is precise enough and that it is not the case that the
extreme bins are populated with analysts that issue few forecasts and consequently their
exaggeration is measured with larger variance. Results to this exercise are reassuring that
this is not the case.
It could also be the case that exaggeration is correlated with some variables that could
potentially help explain this return pattern. In fact, Chen and Jiang (2006) ﬁnd that exag-
geration and ability are indeed correlated, and from the analysis in section II we should also
16Notice that this is not a statement about the average exaggeration or compression of information by
ﬁnancial analysts. It does not imply that analysts on average exaggerate (or investors perceive that analysts
exaggerate) both goods and bad news, it only means that those who exaggerate more (or compress less)
when making forecasts also do so with recommendations. It is therefore not inconsistent with previous
studies that show that analysts, on average, underweight bad news.
18expect ability to be correlated with abnormal returns following recommendation revisions.
To explore this issue and to make sure I am not simply capturing the eect of ability on
returns Table IV presents two-way cuts on exaggeration and ability. Table IV shows that
the average event return dierential between low- and high-exaggeration analysts’ recom-
mendations declines as the ability of the analysts increases. While the return dierential
is positive and signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst two ability quartiles, it becomes insigniﬁcant, even
when it continues to be positive, for recommendations issued by high ability analysts. Thus
it does not appear that what I ﬁnd is simply an ability eect since the two way sort still
produce a strong negative relation between abnormal event returns and exaggeration for the
ﬁrst two quartiles in both subsamples (one and two level changes). In particular the Low —
High exaggeration strategy produces an average event return of more than 3% for two level
changes in these ﬁrst two quartiles. Table IV also shows that ability and exaggeration also
tend to be negatively correlated in this sample.
Two-way cuts on exaggeration and prior’s precision, proxied by the inverse of the stan-
dard deviation of stock returns, produces even stronger results. The average event return
dierential between low- and high-exaggeration analysts’ recommendations is positive and
signiﬁcant for almost all precision quartiles. Table V also makes evident the importance of
variables that proxy for the amount of public information on the stock being recommended
for the magnitude of event returns; a Low — High precision strategy produces hedge event
returns that are at times close to 10% for a the 5 calendar day window.
Studies of event returns following recommendation issuance have typically included
other variables, which most of the time can be identiﬁed either with ability or preci-
sion/uncertainty. Among them we ﬁnd analysts’ experience, which could be thought of
some sort of surrogate for ability, trading volume and, specially, size of the stock being
covered; with company size typically found to be negatively correlated to market reaction
to recommendation changes (both of these variables can be interpreted as proxies for the
amount or precision of public information in the trading environment, even when in the
literature they are rarely presented in this way). Agrawal and Chen (2005b) also ﬁnd that
reputation (again an ability-like variable) is positively related to market reaction. Here I
use the Carter and Manaster (1990) measure to capture reputation, in this case related to
19employer reputation (which is also a measure of broker size).17
Ie x p l o r et h ee ect of these variables, together with the ones I previously identiﬁed,
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where the subscript i denotes a recommendation revision and:
Tm_x (m=1 to 4) is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation
revision is positive and issued by an analyst in the jth quartile, and 0 otherwise.
Tn_g (n=1 to 4) is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the recommendation
revision is negative and issued by an anlayst in the kth quartile, and 0 otherwise.
ISi}h_u, WYro_u, H{s_u, ESi}h_u, ZOg_u> Delo_u, IYro_u (u = x or g)a r eas e t
of control variables related to both the analyst issuing the recommendation and the ﬁrm
which stock is being recommended: ﬁrm size, trading volume, analyst’s tenure in the job,
broker size, analyst’s workload, analyst ability (measured continuously) and stock return
volatility (measured continuously) respectively. And where _x stands for upward revision
whereas _g stands for downward revision (this is because I let the regression coe!cient
on each of these controls dier depending on whether the recommendation positively or
negatively revises the outstanding recommendation).
lqgxvwu| gxpplhv, wlph gxpplhv are a set of dummy variables for I/B/E/S 2-digit
S/I/G industries and each calendar year respectively.
I estimate this regression using both, all recommendation revisions and only those revi-
sions that are not preceded by another recommendation revision for the same ﬁrm in the
four previous days. With this second procedure I intend to address the potential problem
of clustered observations that generates cross-sectionally correlated errors and inﬂates test
statistics. In both cases I use heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Results are
reported in Table VI. Notably, the inverse relationship between exaggeration and abnormal
17Even the workload variable previously pointed out can be interpreted as a measure of eective ability.
20event returns is still present and strong. Recommendations issued by analysts in the lower
exaggeration quartile command ﬁve-day hedge returns that are 1.44% (1.06%) higher than
those issued for analysts in the higher exaggeration quartile, for two level changes (one level
change); even when I control for variables that have been found to be linked to analysts’
exaggeration18. Of the employed controls, ability and ﬁrm volatility, as well as ﬁrm size and
broker size or reputation explain a signiﬁcant proportion of the cross-sectional variation in
reactions to recommendation changes, on the other hand workload, experience and trad-
ing volume are only signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations or never at all. These results point
to only a fraction of the relationship between exaggeration in forecasts and recommenda-
tions discovered in this study being explained by ability or any of the variables that have
traditionally been linked to returns to recommendation changes.
4.2 Post-Event and Long Term Returns
Having explored abnormal returns surrounding recommendation release dates I now turn
to post event returns. An analysis of post event returns can shed light on whether the
market e!ciently adjusts for dierences among analysts or not. Moreover it can qualify the
results found in the previous section, as a mere event phenomenon, if these are reversed
afterwards. I will therefore be looking for return continuations or reversals. I estimate
post event annualized returns for a strategy consisting on buying stocks which have been
u p g r a d e dt h r e ed a y sb e f o r e( i . e .a f t e rt h ee v e n tw i n d o wi so v e r )a n ds h o r t i n gt h o s es t o c k s
that have been downgraded; holding them for 6 or 12 months. Upgraded stocks are placed
in one of eight portfolios, depending on whether the recommendation revision entails a
one or two recommendation level change and on which exaggeration quartile the analyst
w h om a d et h er e v i s i o nb e l o n g st o .T h es a m ei sd o n ew i t hd o w n g r a d e ds t o c k s .Ia s s u m ea
one-dollar investment in each recommendation. To mitigate biases related to the bid-ask
bounce portfolio weights are adjusted daily to reﬂect past returns on stocks comprising each
18Hedge returns are computed as [H(EKDU | T1_x =1 ) H(EKDU | T4_x =1 ) ] 
[H(EKDU | T1_g =1 ) H(EKDU | T4_g =1 ) ] ,w h i c hi se q u a lt o(1  4)  (1  4).N o t i c e
that since EKDUv are linear in the (same) controls, both for positive and negative revisions, it does not
matter where the dierence is calculated (i.e. for which values of the controls).
21portfolio, eectively proceeding as if returns were value-weighted thereafter (Sorescu and
Subrahmanyam (2006)). Speciﬁcally, if Ulw is the rate of return on stock l on day w,t h er a t e






where zlw is the cumulative return on day w o fao n ed o l l a rp o s i t i o ni n v e s t e di ns t o c k
l. Hedge returns are formed by subtracting, each month, the return on the downgraded
portfolio (the short leg) from the corresponding return on the equivalent, in terms of revision
levels and exaggeration, upgraded portfolio (the long leg).
I regress raw returns generated by each strategy on a constant (for raw returns), the
three Fama-French (1993) factors and a constant, or the three Fama-French factors plus
momentum (as done in Carhart (1997)) and the constant. The corresponding intercepts
provide a daily measure of abnormal returns for each horizon. Annualized abnormal returns
are computed by multiplying this daily intercept by 252. Owing to the controversy about
the interpretation of these factors, in particular the momentum factor, these ﬁgures could
be interpreted either as a risk-adjusted return measure or only as some kind of performance
metric.
Table VII displays results for six months holding period returns. Consistent with previ-
ous studies there are signiﬁcant, both statistically and economically, post event abnormal
returns on the months following the recommendation change. These amount to an annual-
ized 8% — 11% hedge return, depending on the number of recommendation levels changed,
which suggest that the market does not readily absorb information contained in recom-
mendation changes.19 These results are still present, but weaker, when I extend the holding
period to twelve months (Table VII b). It is clear then that there is a marked under-reaction
to analysts’ recommendation changes, with positive and signiﬁcant abnormal hedge returns
for the months immediately following the recommendation change. Results that become
weaker the longer the holding period of the upgraded/downgraded stock (adding further
19Negative recommendation changes command negative (and signiﬁcant) abnormal returns in the six
months following the recommendation release, even when in raw terms those returns are positive. The
average daily return for stocks in the downgraded portfolio in the period considered is 0.039%, whereas the
average return of the market in that same period is 0.049%.
22months with zero abnormal returns dilutes the evidence against market e!ciency found
at shorter windows) and tend to evaporate once we control for momentum, but only for
12 month or longer holding periods, which is consistent with Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and
Lee’s (2004) observation that analysts tend to recommend positive momentum stocks (and
glamour stocks in general).
Abnormal returns to recommendation changes by less exaggerating analysts, however,
do not seem to be associated to larger or smaller post revision drifts. Tests of dierential
under-reaction to Quartile 1 and Quartile 4 analysts’ recommendations are not signiﬁcant
at the usual (5%) levels, for none of the horizons and level changes considered, what seems
to suggest that investors properly recognize exaggeration dierences among analysts.20
What may be troubling for market e!ciency in assimilating analysts’ information though
is the existence of a signiﬁcant drift immediately after recommendation issuance. In e!cient
markets expected abnormal returns to any strategy that conditions on publicly available in-
formation should be zero. This drift, which can be interpreted as a sort of momentum
return, quickly recedes after the ﬁrst one or two months. These results would suggest that
the marginal investor is relatively better at grasping cross-sectional dierences among ana-
lysts than at correctly assessing the information content of the average recommendation.21
In light of the magnitude of dierential event returns, the fact that there are mostly not
signiﬁcant post event dierential returns is remarkable.
In any case, what is important to notice is that dierential event returns between both
groups of analysts are never reversed in the post-event window. In fact, those initial dif-
ferences between low- and high-exaggeration analysts’ recommendations remain signiﬁcant
even for holding periods of 6 to 12 months, the time horizons most typically attributed to
ﬁnancial analysts.22 This is reﬂected in Table VII c that, using the same methodology used
for post-event returns, compares portfolios of less exaggerating analysts’ recommendations,
20With a more traditional calendar month portfolio strategy similar results obtain.
21Transaction costs probably prevent arbitrageurs from trading to eliminate these abnormal returns. If
this were the case, i.e. not a problem of di!culties in assimilating information or misrepresented market
signals, that would certainly speaks in favor of information absorption of more sophisticated investors.
22And this even when results naturally tend to become weaker the longer the holding period considered,
since adding further months with zero abnormal returns adds noise and dilutes the evidence found at shorter
windows.
23formed in event time and kept for holding periods of 6 to 12 months, to similar portfolios
built using recommendations issued by high exaggeration analysts. The magnitude of Quar-
tile 1 minus Quartile 4 annualized returns for both holding periods is consistent with the
dierences observed in event time (for six month holding periods the dierence in abnormal
returns, absent any dierences in the post event window, should be twice as large as that
found in event time, since in this case the strategy invests twice per year in the event).
5 The Incremental Informativeness of Forecasts-Based
Measures of Performance
Recent studies by Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2004) and Li (2005) note that analysts
exhibit persistent dierences in stock picking ability. That is, that those analysts whose
recommendation revisions earned the most (least) excess returns in the past continue to
outperform (underperform) in the future. This result is entirely consistent with the ﬁndings
of the previous section. If I am able to identify dierential abnormal returns to groups
of analysts sorted based on their forecast-based exaggeration and ability levels it is only
because those attributes are persistent through time. At the same time if recommenda-
tion revisions made by analysts who made more proﬁtable recommendations in the past
continue to outperform other recommendations it is because of those analysts’ ability and
exaggeration (or lack of it).
In my previous analysis of exaggeration and ability I avoid using Mikhail et al.’s recom-
mendation - based measure of ability as control information for obvious reasons (if I were to
use it I would be controlling for the same thing I want to measure, ability and exaggeration,
aggregated in only one magnitude, past recommendation performance). In spite of this,
there is still the question of whether forecasts would have predictive power about analysts’
future recommendations proﬁtability, even after controlling for past recommendations per-
formance. It is clear that equipped with an inﬁnitely large sample of past recommendations,
and provided that the model introduced in Section II is a reasonably accurate description
of reality, there should be nothing to add from forecasts once analysts have been classiﬁed
24based on abnormal returns to their past recommendations. In reality, however, samples
are limited and therefore past forecasts could potentially provide incremental information,
especially since there are typically more earnings forecasts than recommendations.23 Using
information from both sources would be like joining two non-perfectly correlated samples,
something that should likely help improve inference. On the other hand the possibility re-
mains that forecast-based information, if loosely tied to that of recommendations, may be
too noisy to add anything signiﬁcant. This is in any case an eminently empirical question.
Mikhail et al.’s (2004) recommendation-derived ability measure, which I take to summa-
rize information available from past recommendations, is not indeed a pure ability measure
but rather it blends ability and exaggeration; therefore I proceed to compare it with a
forecast-based measure that similarly aggregates ability and exaggeration. This measure is
formed by combining exaggeration and ability forecast-based rankings into a single one. To
obtain this measure I ﬁrst simultaneously rank analysts into ten deciles (twice) in decreasing
order of exaggeration, and in increasing order of ability, and then average both rankings
to obtain a single measure. Both exaggeration and ability are measured as described in
Section III. In a ﬁnal step I proceed to sort analysts into four quartiles based on their aver-
aged exaggeration-ability measure. The highest (lowest) ranked analysts according to this
classiﬁcation will be those who typically exaggerate less (more) and exhibit a higher (lower)
forecast-based ability.
At the same time, as in Mikhail et al. (2004), I use the following ﬁxed-eects model to
estimate the average ﬁve-day excess return of taking a long (short) position in each analyst’s
upward (downward) revisions, controlling for brokerage house, ﬁrm and time period eects
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where BHAR is again the ﬁve-day buy and hold size adjusted abnormal return from
taking long (short) positions in upward (downward) recommendation revisions issued by
23An additional reason to look to forecast information is the recent evidence on selective recommendation
deletion. If as Ljungqvist et al. (2006) note forecasts do not suer from the same anonymization problem
past recommendations seem to face then the use of forecast information could potentially help to improve
the accuracy and reduce the bias in past “available” recommendations.
25analyst j employed at brokerage house k for ﬁrm m at year t. The estimates of m represent
the average recommendation proﬁtability for analyst j, conditional on his employer and the
ﬁrms and years in his portfolio of revisions. I then use a method analogous to the one used
for earnings forecasts before; ﬁrst I rank analysts in ten deciles based on the excess returns
associated with their revisions for the preceding two-year period, both for recommendations
upgrades and downgrades separately, and then compute the average rank of each analyst
(the average of positive and negative recommendations rank).24 I ﬁnally proceed to sort
analysts in four groups based on this average ranking.
Table VIII presents two-way cuts on forecast-based and recommendation-based exag-
geration - ability indexes. It is immediately evident that both measures have signiﬁcant
explanatory power over future event returns, and that none of the two is subsumed by
the other. Stocks recommended by analysts branded as low exaggeration-high ability tend
to exhibit substantially higher hedge returns, in a ﬁve-day window of the recommenda-
tion change, than stocks recommended by high exaggeration-low ability analysts; and these
results repeat for each of the four quartiles deﬁned based on past recommendation perfor-
mance. The magnitude of the dierence is notorious; while two level (one level) revisions
by analysts in the lowest quartile of the forecast-based index typically command on average
abnormal returns of 6.34% (5.94%) the same revision by analysts in the highest quartile is
associated to abnormal returns of 9.77% (8.30%) on average, that is, 54% (39%) larger. By
the same token, recommendation-based quartiles produce a hedge return spread between
low past proﬁtability and high past proﬁtability analysts of 2.18% for two level changes
(2.94% for one level changes) on average, for each forecast-based quartile. The combined
eect of conditioning on both past forecasts and recommendations can be appreciated by
comparing abnormal returns to recommendation revisions by analysts rankest in the lowest
quartile according to both indexes, 5.75%, to those same abnormal returns following recom-
mendation revisions by analysts that rank the highest according to both past forecasts and
recommendations, 11.36%; that is a dierence of 100% (the corresponding ﬁgures for one
level revisions are 5.57% and 10.47%). As expected both rankings are positively correlated,
we are after all attempting to measure something similar in two alternative ways or using
24I rank recommendation upgrades and downgrades separately due to the characteristically dierent
return reaction to both kinds of revisions.
26two dierent sources of information, although the correlation is not as high as it might have
been expected; the Spearman and Pearson correlation coe!cients between them is 0.05 (and
signiﬁcant). Both measures contain a signiﬁcant amount of orthogonal information.
6 Further Discussion and Related Issues
6.1 The Timing of Forecasts and Recommendations
One question that arises from the results obtained in previous sections is whether the smaller
abnormal returns that follow recommendations made by highly exaggerating analysts are
related to the timing of these recommendations. Concretely, it could be the case that these
analysts simply tend to follow or repeat recommendations upgrades or downgrades made by
other (perhaps more qualiﬁed) analysts. In that case, abnormal returns to recommendations
issued by high exaggeration analysts would tend to be lower if anything because a signiﬁcant
part of the return reaction would have already taken place by the time they release their
recommendation revision. At the same time, almost by deﬁnition, the recommendation
change would be exaggerated, since there is practically no new information on which to
base the new recommendation (market prices would have already absorbed the, by then,
old information).
What I ﬁnd, however, is that there is no relationship between exaggeration and the
timing of recommendations and forecasts. Recommendations made by Quartile 1 (low
exaggeration) analysts are equally likely to be preceded by another recommendation, for the
same stock by a dierent analyst, in a ﬁve-day window, as Quartile 4 (high exaggeration)
analysts’ recommendations are. And the same is true for forecasts. 17.4% of Quartile 1
analysts’ recommendations are issued after another recommendation (in the ﬁve previous
days) vs. 16.7% of Quartile 4 analysts’ recommendations (the same ﬁgures are 58.1% for Q1
vs. 57.5% for Q4 for forecasts). These results are robust to changes in the window length.
276.2 An Alternative Forecast-Based Measure of Ability
Zitzewitz (2001) proposed a measure of information content that can be interpreted as an
attempt to quantify analysts’ forecasts economic value to its users. Zitzewitz’s measure,
which is deﬁned as follows:
(17) LF] = 
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where  is the regression coe!cient in the following regression:
(18) (]w+  Fw3)= + ] (Iw  Fw3)+%w
can be thought of also as the variance of F — C, which if zero mean tells us how far from
consensus the analyst typically forecasts, adjusted for an analyst’s exaggeration.
This is an ex-ante measure of analysts’ information content, and not of the information
content of a particular forecast. It quantiﬁes the average value of forecasts issued by a
particular analyst, and therefore can be used to assess the expected value of future forecasts
by that analyst. But once a forecast is released and one can condition on it, an analysts’
expected deviation from consensus is irrelevant (since we can compute the actual deviation
of that given forecast) and all that needs to be known to assess the value of that forecast,
in addition to by how much the forecast has been revised, is the analyst’s predisposition to
herd/exaggerate.
In the context of stock recommendations however, exaggeration, and the recommenda-
tion itself, are generally not enough (as shown in Section 2) to fully characterize expected
abnormal returns to a given recommendation change. The discrete nature of recommen-
dations makes analysts’ ability also important. Therefore we should expect Zitzewitz’s
information content measure, which can be considered a proxy for analyst ability, to be
related to (and be useful in predicting) abnormal returns to recommendation revisions.
I explore this link using the same method used before, ﬁrst I sort analysts in four groups
based on their past forecast information content, using the measure in (17) and then explore
abnormal returns to each of the quartiles both at recommendation issuance and in the
months following it. What I ﬁnd is that those stocks recommended by analysts with a larger
28information content measure tend to exhibit substantially higher hedge returns, in a window
of the recommendation change, than the stocks recommended by lower information content
analysts. The magnitude of the dierence is both economically and statistically signiﬁcant
and survives the inclusion of several control variables commonly employed in the literature;25
while two level (one level) revisions by a low information content analyst typically command
abnormal returns of 6.67% (5.90%) the same revision by a large information content analyst
is associated to abnormal returns of 9.82% (8.11%) on average; that is 47% (37%) larger.
This evidence further reinforces the idea that past forecasts can be a valuable source of
information in assessing the quality of analysts’ stock recommendations.
6 . 3 AQ u i c kL o o ka tF o r e c a s tR e v i s i o n s
As happens with recommendations, there is also overwhelming evidence of delayed market
response to earnings forecasts. Previous studies observe that it takes the market up to a year
t of u l l yd i g e s te a r n i n g si n f o r m a t i o n . 26 It would be interesting to corroborate whether market
response to forecast revisions also matches other features of recommendations besides this
one; namely, recognition of dierences in the quality of the forecast signal in a short window
of the forecast release date, and absence of dierential post event drift following forecasts
issued by analysts grouped according to their perceived exaggeration.
Since forecasts are about earnings, which are eventually made public at a known date,
any misinterpretation or failure to adjust for biases at the time the forecast is released
should necessarily be reﬂected on earnings announcement dates’ abnormal returns, if not
before. And these abnormal returns be predictable based on past forecasts, which were
the source of ﬂawed expectations. I therefore isolate last forecasts (before announcement)
and choose to measure post event abnormal returns around earnings announcement dates.
The possibility of identifying a narrow event where expectation mistakes are revealed is an
advantage of forecasts with no correlate in recommendations.
25What suggest that results are not driven by this measure being just a proxy of analysts’ audience
size (or employer reputation). I do not control however by exaggeration and both, Zitzewitz’s information
content measure and the exaggeration measure I used in previous sections are indeed strongly correlated;
the Spearman and Pearson correlation coe!cients between them is -0.569.
26See Gleason and Lee (2003) for references to this literature.
29I work with normalized forecast revisions, i.e. earnings forecasts divided by share price
at the end of the month that precedes the revision. The purpose of this normalization is to
make earnings forecasts homogeneous. The unit of analysis is no longer earnings per share,
which is an arbitrary magnitude every time equity can be divided among any number of
shares, but earnings per dollar of share value, which is free from that problem.27 Ia l s o
treat forecasts as a continuous variables, which is another dierence with recommendations.
Other than this I follow the same steps I followed before for stock recommendations. First I
sort analysts into four quartiles depending on their exaggeration levels, estimated using the
beta coe!cient in equation (6). And then I compute abnormal returns to forecast revisions
made by analysts in each of these four groups, making sure again the sorting information is
publicly available at the time of the classiﬁcation and therefore part of investors’ information
set.
Being forecast revisions a continuous variable I use a regression approach to study ab-
normal returns surrounding them. I estimate the following model for quartile 1 and quartile
4 analysts:28
(19) EKDUl






Results, displayed in Table IX, are aligned with the previously reported ﬁndings on rec-
ommendation changes. Forecast revisions issued by less exaggerating analysts command
larger abnormal returns per unit of revision than those of more exaggerating analysts, sug-
gesting that the market eectively discounts dierences among analysts. These dierences
are more notorious and signiﬁcant when we concentrate on isolated forecasts, deﬁned as
those that are not preceded by another forecast for that same stock in the previous four
days (second row of table IX), which are far larger than when we use all forecasts issued by
analysts. Moreover post event abnormal returns, which I choose to measure around earnings
announcement dates, when all uncertainty about earnings is revealed and where corrections
27It is very dierent to revise an earnings per share ﬁgure by 50 cents when the share is worth 5 dollars,
than when it is worth 100 dollars. Since twenty 5 dollar shares could be re-bundled into one 100 dollars
share, the equivalent earnings revision would be 10 dollars (50 cents multiplied by 20) and the impact on
returns consequently larger.
28I exclude observations for which the absolute value of the normalized forecast revisions is larger than
0.25. This reduces our sample in less than 0.1% and allow us to exclude extreme outliers.
30should take place if there were any misguided expectations, are small and approximately
equal for both groups of analysts.29 What again suggests that while there is a post forecast
revision drift, it is not signiﬁcantly dierent for both groups of analysts.
7 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper I explore the implications of analysts’ misweighting behavior for their stock rec-
ommendations. More speciﬁcally, I investigate whether the same misweighting phenomenon
that has been uncovered for earnings forecasts is also present in stock recommendations; the
way it manifests in the data; and the extent to which investors are aware of, and properly
adjust for it.
I ﬁnd that analysts whose forecast revisions showed signs of greater exaggeration in the
past make recommendation changes that lead to lower abnormal returns than their peers;
consistent with the idea that their recommendation revisions are also more exaggerated.
Dierences around short windows of the recommendation change are notorious; recommen-
dations issued by analysts in the highest exaggeration quartile lead to abnormal returns
that are on average 25% lower than those of analysts in the lowest exaggeration quartile.
Importantly these initial dierences are never reversed afterwards, and remain signiﬁcant
even for holding periods of 6 to 12 months, the time horizons most typically attributed
to ﬁnancial analysts. My results also indicate that cross-sectional patterns in information
misweighting or exaggeration are highly correlated with analysts’ ability. On average, the
analysts who exaggerate the most are the ones whose pronouncements provide less infor-
mation. I also ﬁnd that there is an important under-reaction to recommendation changes,
reﬂected in signiﬁcant post event returns. This under-reaction is equally pronounced for rec-
ommendations issued by analysts in any of the exaggeration quartiles, which would suggest
29This dierence is interesting in itself and grants further studying. According to my ﬁgures highly
exaggerating analysts’ revisions do not have a noticeable impact on prices when they are issued in isolation.
Only when they follow another revision (what may question their informativeness) they are associated to
signiﬁcant abnormal returns. It is possible then that even those measured returns are the result to lags in
market response to new information.
31that the marginal investor is relatively better at grasping cross-sectional dierences among
analysts than at correctly assessing the information content of the average recommendation.
The study shows that analysts’ misweighting patterns, which existence had been pre-
viously documented in the context of earnings forecasts, are indeed signiﬁcant and vary
notably and predictably across analysts. Remarkably, the study also demonstrates the use-
fulness of forecast derived information in characterizing analysts’ recommending behavior,
and their incremental informativeness even in the presence of information obtained from past
recommendations. Variables constructed based on the performance of past earnings fore-
casts are as successful in predicting future returns to recommendation revisions as variables
built from past return reactions to recommendation changes, and both contain information
not subsumed by the other.
32A Appendix
1. Proposition 2:
Proof. It is equivalent to show that
CHnu>ku>SFu[DU|Up]
Cnu ? (A)0for positive (negative)
recommendations.
Substituting analyst’s recommendation strategy, (10) and (11), into equation (12) yields:
(A.1) Hnu>ku>SFu [DU | Up]=H [DU | Wp31 ?n u\u ?W p]
Then, by Bayes’ rule (9):




nu ?\ u ? Wp
nu
i







Since the expectation in (A.2) depends on nu only through the threshold parameters,
Wp31
nu and Wp
nu , it is straightforward to see that H [DU | Up] gets smaller in absolute value as
nu increases (the thresholds move monotonically closer to zero and so does the conditional
expectation). Therefore
CH[DU|Up]
Cnu ? 0 for positive recommendations (and thresholds), and
CH[DU|Up]
Cnu A 0 for negative ones.
(ii) Since the main parameter of interest is n@k that is what is kept ﬁxed in proposition
2 (ii) when taking the partial derivatives (and not n).
Taking advantage of the following change of variables
z = nu@ku } = nu\u
(A.2) can be re-expressed as:
(A.3) H nu
ku >ku>SFu [DU | Up]= 1
zH [} | Wp31 ?}?W p]
30From equations (7) and (8), exploiting common knowledge of the prior distribution..






Since ku and SFu enter in (A.3) symmetrically, only through the variance of } —the larger
ku the larger the variance (and therefore the ﬂatter the distribution) whereas the larger SFu




CK A 0( ?)0for {A(?)0 ,w h e r e
! is }’s density,  is any positive constant, and K = ku
SFu. That is, that as K increases the
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37Table I
A
Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell
Strong Buy - 12,996 12,168 242 297
Buy 11,705 - 19,706 799 256
Hold 8,423 13,901 - 3,611 1,638
Sell 106 447 2,401 - 199
Strong Sell 155 149 1,410 87 -





































Number of recommendation revisions in each of the 20 categories defined by the crossing of the current 
recommendation level with the prior recommendation level (excluding recommendation repetitions).
Number of positive and negative recommendation revisions of 1, 2, 3 and 4 levels (level changes defined 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Q1 (Low) Q4 (High)
Q1 (Low) 9.04% 10.20% 9.35% 9.94%
9.74% 9.35% 8.32% 9.54%
5.16% 6.95% 8.08% 11.15%
Q4 (High) 6.60% 6.61% 8.38% 9.72%
2.43% 3.59% 0.97% 0.21%
(4.75)** (22.26)*** (1.17) (0.03)
Q1 (Low) Q4 (High)
Q1 (Low) 7.17% 8.26% 7.77% 8.69%
6.09% 7.00% 6.91% 8.18%
5.74% 5.60% 6.39% 7.38%
Q4 (High) 5.59% 6.12% 6.96% 7.47%
1.58% 2.14% 0.81% 1.22%
(6.71)*** (17.32)*** (1.12) (2.71)*
Q1 (Low) Q4 (High)
Q1 (Low) 2271 4890 6325 9526
2476 5588 8289 8394
4441 6026 6156 3883
Q4 (High) 6924 6794 3508 1865
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the [t-2; t+2] window of a recommendation change (t=0). BHARs are computed using a 
Size-adjusted Return Model (i.e. returns from the corresponding decile of AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE are subtracted from the raw event 
returns). Recommendation revisions of one and two levels are classified according to a double sorting procedure. First they are
sorted into four groups depending on the overweighting or exaggeration level of the analyst issuing the recommendation. At the 
same time they are classified into four categories according to ability of that same analyst. Exaggeration Level is computed using the 
regression coefficient in the regression of forecast error on forecast deviation from consensus. Ability is quantified using the measure 
in equation (12) in the paper. F statistics of the difference in hedge returns of following recommendations from Q1 (low exaggeration)
vs. Q4 (high exaggeration) analysts in a five day window is provided for each ability level. The last panel shows the number of
recommendation revisions (of one and two levels) in each of the sixteen exaggeration - ability pairs.
Ability
Exagger.
Short Term (Event) Returns by Exaggeration and Ability
Recommendations Distribution







Q1 - Q4 (Exagger.)
Q1 - Q4 (Exagger.)Table V
Q1 (Low) Q4 (High)
Q1 (Low) 15.26% 10.39% 7.49% 5.27%
14.52% 10.04% 6.64% 5.02%
12.08% 8.63% 5.56% 4.56%
Q4 (High) 11.71% 8.37% 5.50% 3.57%
3.55% 2.02% 2.00% 1.70%
(7.79)*** (6.04)** (9.87)*** (10.37)***
Q1 (Low) Q4 (High)
Q1 (Low) 12.85% 9.43% 5.39% 4.36%
11.99% 8.07% 5.47% 4.01%
10.57% 7.47% 4.47% 3.32%
Q4 (High) 10.65% 7.03% 4.87% 3.67%
2.20% 2.40% 0.52% 0.69%
(9.00)*** (21.01)*** (0.65) (5.13)**
Q1 (Low) Q4 (High)
Q1 (Low) 6021 6048 5655 5093
5904 6319 6326 6045
4608 5099 5283 5353
Q4 (High) 4557 4551 4848 4960
Short Term (Event) Returns by Exaggeration and Prior Precision
Two Level Revisions
Precision
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the [t-2; t+2] window of a recommendation change (t=0). BHARs are computed using a 
Size-adjusted Return Model (i.e. returns from the corresponding decile of AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE are subtracted from the raw event 
returns). Recommendation revisions of one and two levels are classified according to a double sorting procedure. First they are
sorted into four groups depending on the overweighting or exaggeration level of the analyst issuing the recommendation. At the 
same time they are classified into four categories according to the inverse of the standard deviation of daily stock returns of the firm 
being recommended (prior precision). Exaggeration Level is computed using the regression coefficient in the regression of forecast
error on forecast deviation from consensus. F statistics of the difference in hedge returns of following recommendations from Q1 (low 
exaggeration) vs. Q4 (high exaggeration) analysts in a five day window is provided for each precision level. The last panel shows the 






Q1 - Q4 (Exagger.)
Q1 - Q4 (Exagger.)
***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Recommendations Distribution
PrecisionTable VI
One Level Two Levels One Level Two Levels
All Revisions All Revisions Non-Overlapp Rev Non-Overlapp Rev
Q1_up 0.0110 0.0083 0.0074 0.0043
(3.17)** (1.14) (2.58)** (0.56)
Q2_up 0.0076 0.0079 0.0041 0.0062
(2.20)** (1.16) (1.14) (0.84)
Q3_up 0.0047 0.0037 0.0013 0.0001
(1.41) (0.56) (0.38) (0.02)
Q4_up 0.0072 0.0029 0.0040 -0.0001
(2.29)** (0.43) (1.23) (-0.01)
Q1_dn -0.0167 -0.0242 -0.0089 -0.0182
(-4.92)*** (-3.89)*** (-2.64)*** (-2.99)***
Q2_dn -0.0134 -0.0181 -0.0069 -0.0139
(-3.61)*** (-3.13)*** (-1.76)* (-2.41)**
Q3_dn -0.0102 -0.0143 -0.0043 -0.0085
(-3.19)*** (-2.61)*** (-1.18) (-1.53)
Q4_dn -0.0100 -0.0153 -0.0024 -0.0108
(-3.11)*** (-2.77)*** (0.75) (-1.92)*
Exp_up -2.55E-07 -1.86E-07 -2.84E-09 3.46E-07
(-0.73) (-0.33) (-0.01) (0.64)
TVol_up 2.39E-11 -2.09E-11 1.36E-11 -1.40E-11
(1.16) (-0.38) (0.60) (-0.22)
FSize_up -1.21E-10 -9.13E-11 -1.37E-10 -9.93E-11
(-5.28)*** (-1.72)* (-5.43)*** (-1.79)*
BSize_up 0.0052 0.0121 0.0048 0.0110
(4.36)*** (5.93)*** (3.90)*** (5.37)***
WLoad_up -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-4.45)*** (-6.58)*** (-3.64)*** (-5.46)***
Abil_up 0.0259 0.0373 0.0271 0.0301
(4.86)*** (4.15)*** (5.01)*** (3.42)***
Fvolat_up 0.7756 0.9000 0.7382 0.8749
(11.15)*** (4.84)*** (10.30)*** (4.33)***
Exp_dn -4.68E-07 1.04E-06 -1.65E-06 -1.53E-07
(-1.23) (1.64)* (-4.28)*** (-0.23)
TVol_dn -2.58E-11 -4.01E-11 -6.82E-12 1.95E-11
(-1.32) (-0.94) (-0.31) (0.39)
FSize_dn 1.37E-10 1.87E-10 1.33E-10 1.93E-10
(5.68)*** (4.03)*** (5.41)*** (4.21)***
BSize_dn -0.0036 -0.0140 -0.0024 -0.0139
(-2.58)** (-5.98)*** (-1.66)* (-5.86)***
WLoad_dn 0.0001 3.36E-05 0.0000 0.0000
(4.48)*** (1.24) (2.40)** (0.55)
Abil_up -0.0231 -0.0350 -0.0245 -0.0269
(-2.75)*** (-3.16)*** (-2.62)*** (-2.36)**
Fvolat_up -0.5324 -0.5767 -0.4543 -0.486275
(-9.88)*** (-4.56)*** (-8.25)*** (-3.68)***
Observations 61,545 23,730 53,323 20,210
R-squared 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.13
1.06% 1.44% 0.98% 1.16%
(14.52)*** (10.24)*** (12.23)*** (6.70)***




Regression of Abnormal Returns to Recommendation Changes
The results from regressing size adjusted Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns on recommendation changes by analysts in each of the four
exaggeration groups (Exaggeration quartiles, 1 to 4) together with a set of control variables, as well as time and industry dummies (not 
reported in the table). "up" indicates upward revision whereas "dn" stands for downward revision. BHARs are computed on a window [t-2; 
t+2] of the recommendation change. In the first column only all one level recommendation revisions are included whereas the second
column is estimated using only all two level recommendation revisions. Columns three and four exclude revisions in multiple revision dates 
and those that are preceded by another revision for the same stock in the previous four days (to account for cross sectional dependence).
Heteroskedasticity robust T statistics are reported in parenthesis. For reporting purposes the constant has been suppressed and replaced 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Q1 (Low) Q4 (High) Q4 - Q1
Q1 (Low) 5.75% 5.61% 6.08% 7.91% 2.16%
(5.22)**
7.16% 8.42% 9.16% 8.91% 1.75%
(3.26)*
8.86% 8.60% 9.51% 10.77% 1.91%
(3.61)*
Q4 (High) 8.45% 9.20% 10.06% 11.36% 2.91%
(10.68)***
2.70% 3.59% 3.97% 3.45%
(9.51)*** (18.74)*** (27.63)*** (13.01)***
Q1 (Low) Q4 (High) Q4 - Q1
Q1 (Low) 5.57% 4.44% 5.93% 7.82% 2.25%
(12.21)***
5.88% 6.18% 6.85% 8.36% 2.48%
(18.94)***
5.83% 6.00% 7.55% 9.59% 3.76%
(46.32)***
Q4 (High) 7.21% 6.76% 8.77% 10.47% 3.26%
(40.64)***
1.63% 2.31% 2.84% 2.64%
(8.12)*** (17.30)*** (41.09)*** (20.06)***
Q4 - Q1
Q4 - Q1
Short Term (Event) Returns Conditioning on Past Forecast and Recommendation Information
Two Level Revisions
One Level Revisions
***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Past Recommendations: Conditional Profitability Index









Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the [t-2; t+2] window of a recommendation change (t=0). BHARs are computed using a Size-adjusted
Return Model (i.e. returns from the corresponding size decile of AMEX/NASDAQ/NYSE are subtracted from the raw event returns). Recommendation
revisions of one and two levels are simultaneously classified according to the average conditional profitability of past stock recommendations issued by
the same analyst issuing the current recommendation (Mikhail et al.’s measure) and according to the average ability (positively weighted) and 
exaggeration (negatively weighted) exhibited by that same analyst in issuing past forecasts. Exaggeration and Ability are computed in the same way as
before and are given equal weights in the construction of the Exaggeration – Ability index (but Exaggeration rankings are inverted, i.e. high 
exaggeration analysts are assigned to low quartiles and vice versa). F statistics of the difference in hedge returns of following recommendations from 
Q4 (high index value) vs. Q1 (low index value) analysts in a five-day window are provided along both dimensions.Table IX
Sample Q1 Analysts Q4 Analysts Observations
(Low Exagger) (High Exagger)
All Forecast Revisions 0.340 0.145 1.45 56973
(2.58)*** (1.43)
Non-Preceded Revisions 0.618 0.031 9.69*** 33394
(4.20)*** (0.27)
Announcement Date 0.012 0.051 2.55 13.926
(1.57) (2.23)**
***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (t statistics are computed deleting repeated or 
overlapping observations)
Abnormal Returns to Forecast Revisions
The table shows estimates of the regression coefficient in the regression of Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns on 
normalized forecast revisions by our two extreme analysts groups (Quartile 1 and 4). BHARs are computed on a 
window [t-2; t+2] of the recommendation change. The first row reports results that include all forecast revisions 
whereas the second row shows results of estimating the above mentioned regression excluding revisions that are 
preceded by another revisions for the same stock (in the previous four days). The final row regress abnormal returns at 
the earnings announcement date on the last forecast revisions before that date. Column three presents the results of 
an F Test of equal abnormal return response to both analysts groups and column four indicates the number of 
observations in each test. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
F Test: (Beta Q1 
= Beta Q4)
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